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and regime support in India: the impact of the crisis", a paper presented at 
the Duke-UNCG Conference on Parliaments, Policy, and Regime Support, 
Duke University, December 2-5, 1982. 
19. A veteran parliamentarian, Madhu Limaye, has charged that the attitude of 
the then leadership of the ruling party has alternated between two sentiments. 
of the former prime minister's (Mrs. Indira Gandhi) approach to parliament. 
"When the opposition is strong as in 1967-72, she is haunted and when it is 
weak, she has total contempt for parliament. While Nehru had greater respect 
for parliament and for the opposition, Mrs. Gandhi is paranoid." As quoted 
by P. P. Balachandran, "Indian parliament: the twilight era," in Probe India, 
December 1981, p. 10. 
20. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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The Polish parliament and labor 
legislation during Solidarityl 
DA VID S. MASON 
Parliaments in communist party states are usually treated in Western 
literature as "rubber stamp" institutions that simply approve policies 
made elsewhere. As such, these bodies do not perform functions of 
interest articulation, representation, or policy-making that are char-
acteristic of many Western legislatures. This assessment, however, 
oversimplifies the issue and obscures important differences in the 
legislatures of the various communist states. It also diverts attention from 
the dynamics of legislative authority in these states, and the extent to 
which the relationship between legislatures and other political institutions 
reflects broader aspects of the political system. 
Even before 1980, the Polish parliament (Sejm) was, along with that of 
Yugoslavia, the most active and autonomous of East European leg-
islatures. During the Solidarity era the role'of the Sejm was enhanced even 
further. The period from August 1980 to December 1981 was the most 
open and fluid era in Poland's postwar history, and, during this time, 
virtually every political institution was reformed or revitalized. The Sejm 
was one of the few institutions that did not undergo substantial change in 
composition, since there were no new elec~ions during this period, but it 
did take on a more active and, at times, clbstreperous role. 
This chapter examines the evolution of the Sejm from 1980 to 1983, 
focusing on the role of the Sejm in the critical area of labor legislation. 
During 1980 and 1981, a new trade union bill and legislation on enterprise 
self-management were two of the major issues that confronted both the 
regime and Solidarity. The Sejm came to play an important role in the 
evolution of these two pieces of legislation. The bill on self-management 
was enacted during this period, in October 1981, after considerable work 
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by the Sejm. The new trade union legislation was not finally enacted until 
October 1982, almost a year into martial law. This was a very different 
environment, and the Sejm's role was much reduced over 1981. All of this 
will lead to a consideration of the role of the Sejm in the Polish political 
system, and a comparison of this role to those in other countries, East and 
West. 
THE ROLE OF THE SEJM IN POLAND 
The Sejm is a unicameral legislative body conslstmg of 460 deputies 
elected in direct elections every three to five years. Deputies of the ruling 
Polish United Workers' Party (the communist party, PUWP) have always 
constituted a majority of the assembly, typically holding about 55 percent 
of the seats. The remaining seats are divided among the PUWP's 
"satellite" parties, the United Peasant Party (113 seats in the 1980 
elections) and the Democratic Party (37 seats), and some non-party 
members (49 in 1980; 74 in the 1985 elections). This last group includes 
representatives of three Catholic groups,2 none of which, however, are 
supported or recognized by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. 
All of the Sejm deputies have permanent jobs elsewhere, and Sejm 
sessions are one to three-day affairs every month or two. Between 
parliamentary sessions, legislative authority is exercised by the Council of 
State, which is elected by the Sejm. Most legislation is introduced by the 
Council of State or by the Council of Ministers, the executive organ of the 
government, although since 1971 Sejm committees may also initiate 
legislation. All legislation passes through at least one of the twenty-five 
permanent committees, including the important Committee on Legislation 
(Komisja Prac Ustawodawczych), which reviews the technical and legal 
aspects of the bills. In recent years especially, two or more of the relevant 
committees will often constitute joint subcommittees to deliberate on a 
bill. Committees sometimes substantially revise legislation before it is 
presented to the plenary session for approval. 3 
After the introduction of martial law in December 1981, the regime 
constituted two "advisory" bodies that were attached to the Sejm, 
p~esumably in an effort to add legitimacy and credibility to that body. The 
STcio-Economic Council (Rada Spoleczno-Gospodarcza) consists of 
ninety-five representatives of large enterprises and other official organ-
izations. The Sejm Advisory Council (Zespol Doradcow Sejmowych) 
c(j)J1sists of academic experts and other specialists. Both are empowered to 
offer advice and formal opinions on legislation and other matters before 
the Sejm. 
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Much of the Western literature on communist parliaments has simply 
dismissed them as "rubber stamps" that have no real legislative or 
representational functions, but rather serve only ceremonial or propa-
gandistic functions. Only in the last decade have some area specialists 
gone beyond this formulation, sometimes arguing that legislatures in some 
communist countries are gaining in importance, and perhaps becoming 
more functional as articulators of populat interests or demands. 4 In the 
first book-length work on the role of communist legislatures, Dan Nelson 
(1982: 8) suggests that while such legislatures may not provide 
representation in the Western sense of either" trustee" or "delegate," 
they may perform "a mediating function, connecting the citizenry to 
government." In the same volume, Stephen White identifies four main 
roles of communist legislatures: (1) to help legitimize the government; 
(2) to provide a means of societal integration and nation-building; (3) to play 
a" not negligible" role in the policy-making process (through refining and 
amending legislation); and (4) to monitor and supervise the work of 
government bodies. The first function is performed by all communist 
legislatures. The second pertains primarily to multinational states such as 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The third and fourth are performed to 
various degrees depending on the state. The Yugoslav legislature has been 
the most active in policy-making; the Polish in supervision. 
Even in the policy-making category, the Polish Sejm has played a role. 
As Simon and Olson (1980:212) have pointed out, the Sejm has "some 
standing" in the political system; its activity is particularly evident in the 
parliamentary committees, which have often revised, delayed, or amended 
legislation submitted to it by executive offices of the government. The role 
of the Sejm may change with changing political circumstances and, as 
such, may act as a kind of" barometer" of political life in Poland. In fact, 
this aspect of the role of the Sejm is recognized by Polish scholars as well, 
as indicated in the following passage: 
The activity of the Sejm ... is a kind of barome~er of the general climate and pulse 
of political life. Just as an intensification of its 4ctivity and an expansion of its role 
in the system is an expression of accelerated social change and democratic 
development, so too a waning of the Sejm's activity and a diminution of its 
authority is a symptom of stagnation and setbacks in the development of social 
and political relations. (Jarosz, 1976: cited in Terry, 1981: 27) 
Thus the role and activity of the Sejm has varied over time, and has been 
particularly synchronous with the cycle of political unrest in Poland. After 
the political upheavals (and leadership changes) of both 1956 and 1970, 
the role of the Sejm increased briefly, only to fall back to relative inactivity 
in subsequent years (Terry, 1981) . 
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The potential for Sejm autonomy has always been circumscribed, 
however, by the lack of competitive elections, the limited number of 
plenary sessions (generally once a month for one day) and "the leading 
role of the Party." 'The Polish United Workers' Party (the communist 
party of Poland) holds about 55 percent of the seats of the Sejm and over 
66 percent of the committee chairmanships, and its leading role insures 
that it exercises substantial control over the other seats as well. Almost all 
legislation is initiated either in government ministries and the Council of 
Ministers, both party controlled, or in the party itself. 5 During the 1970s, 
the regime allowed "informal consultations" between the initiating 
ministries and the corresponding Sejm committees, indicating the limited 
consultative role that the legislature played in those years (Terry, 1981). 
On the other hand, the Sejm had some characteristics that often allowed 
it at least a limited role. The existence of the two satellite parties (the 
Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party) and three Catholic 
political associations in the Sejm "creates an arena in which there is 
considerable potential for interest articulation and aggregation, as well as 
political communication" (Simon and Olson, 1980: 213). Furthermore, 
while the plenary sessions themselves are mostly devoid of debate and 
policy-making, there is some such activity in the Sejm committees. 
Depending on the political character of a bill, party discipline (and 
therefore PUWP control) is not always exerted within Sejm committees; it 
is sometimes withheld until bills are ready for the plenary sessions. Thus, 
committee debates often cut across party lines (Olson and Simon, 1982). 
The number of committees has grown over the years, and the expertise of 
Sejm committee members had increased, adding to the potential role of 
the committees. Thus, even before 1980, Sejm committees occasionally 
made substantive changes to bills presented by the government. 
In the most intensive recent study (in English) of the Sejm, Olson and 
Simon (1982) identify three factors indicating a growing capacity for 
action and independence by the Sejm: a qualitative improvement, in terms 
of training and education, of the membership of the Sejm; increased 
activity by the committees; and increased supervision and control over 
governmental administration. The result, according to the authors, is that 
th6 Sejm was moving from what Michael Mezey (1979) calls a "minimal 
parliament," which accepts government proposals quickly and without 
reServations, to a "marginal" one, which can delay and modify such 
pr0posals. Indeed, as we have seen, the Sejm did take on such 
characteristics even before 1980. 
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The Sejm during Solidarity 
From the very beginning of the Solidarity period, the Sejm experienced a 
renaissance, as did virtually every other institution in Poland. 6 Even in the 
first plenary session of the Sejm after the Gdansk Agreements, on 
September 5, deputies engaged in a lively and open debate on the 
problems facing the country. At first, criticism was focused largely on the 
past (Gierek) leadership, but during 1981 deputies often voiced open 
criticism of the current government as well. Such speeches were most often 
delivered by the non-PUWP deputies. At an October 1981 Sejm plenary 
session, for example, the non-party deputy Romuald Bukowski criticized 
the authorities for" exercising power neither by the will of the people nor 
on its behalf but rather through the implementation of various principles 
that were created in the past" (Radio Free Europe Research [hereafter 
RFER], November 11, 1981). This was surprisingly strong ianguage, but 
was not unique for Sejm speeches during 1981. In its role as critic and 
sounding board for governmental policies, the Sejm came to resemble 
some Western parliaments. The party leadership apparently encouraged 
this autonomy, within limits. In 1981, for example, the PUWP relaxed 
party discipline in the Sejm on votes for personnel appointments (e.g., to 
ministries). This contributed to the appearance, at least, of autonomy and 
independence of the legislature. 7 
Statistical data also demonstrate the increased activity of the Sejm 
during this period. Several new committees were created in 1981 
(continuing a longer-term trend), including permanent committees on 
Complaints and Suggestions and on Workyrs' Self-Management, and an 
extraordinary committee established to monitor fulfillment of the 1980 
Agreements signed between the workers and the government. The 
frequency of committee meetings increased 'from about ten per committee 
per year before 1980 to eighteen per committee per year in 1980-82 (a 
trend which continued after 1982). Sejm d~puties became more active on 
the floor of the legislature as well, as interpellations of government 
officials by deputies jumped from 26 in 1980 to 223 in 1981.8 This activity 
frequently took up the bulk of the time of the Sejm's sessions. Popular 
expectations of the Sejm were shown in the number of letters and 
complaints sent to the Sejm, which increased from 7,786 in the last ten 
months of 1980 to 19,827 in 1981 9 (Niektore Dane Statystyczne, 1985). 
By the end of 1981, the Sejm was even able to resist pressure by the 
regime to pass an Extraordinary Powers Bill which, in restrospect, was an 
attempt to provide legal sanction for the eventual declaration of martial 
law. When the PUWP Central Committee ordered its Sejm deputies to 
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push for such a bill, the non-PUWP deputies balked. They received 
encouragement from both the Church, when Primate Glemp urged 
deputies not to vote for the bill, and from Solidarity, when its Presidium 
threatened a general strike if the bill were passed. All of this was an 
extraordinary display of independence by the Sejm and, as T. G. Ash 
(1983: 242) observes, "another, important facet of the 'collapse of the 
system. '" The laruzelski regime was compelled to declare martial law 
without the bill, and did not achieve legal sanction of the act until after the 
fact. 10 
More importantly, the Polish parliament involved itself deeply in some 
of the many and important reform bills of the Solidarity era. The Sejm did 
not ever initiate these bills, but Sejm committees often played a major role 
in mediating between different groups with contending versions of reform 
legislation. The Sejm played a crucial role, for example, in bringing to 
fruition a revision of the Teachers' Charter, which addressed such issues 
as teachers' salaries and workloads, pedagogical techniques, and, probably 
most importantly, curricular content. A draft charter was initially put 
together by the Polish Teachers' Association (ZNP) , but two more 
versions emerged from the government's Council of Ministers and then 
from the Teachers' Solidarity. By May 1981, "an acute impasse had 
appeared" (Trybuna Ludu, October 26, 1981) and the Sejm Committee on 
Education and Upbringing was brought in to mediate. All during the 
summer and fall, the committee arranged conferences with experts, 
teachers, representatives of the two unions and the Council of Ministers, 
and even sent deputies to the provinces for "fact-finding." As the 
chairman of the Sejm Committee wrote in October, "it is one of the 
committee's roles to reconcile positions, to try for a common consensus in 
proposing solutions, and in par~icularly difficult cases, to propose 
compromise solutions" (Glos Nauczycielski, October 25, 1981). A 
compromise version was finally achieved in early December and approved, 
with only minor revisions, by the full Sejm in early 1982 (after the 
declaration of martial law). The Sejm, and particularly Sejm committees, 
played a similar role in numerous other sensitive and difficult legislative 
issues. 
I 
Public opinion and the Sejm 
Dhring 1981, the Sejm was the most popular official political institution in 
P<l>land, perhaps because of the kind of open debate and autonomous 
a6tivity described above. In polls on confidence in fourteen institutions, 
conducted in May by the government and in September by Solidarity, the 
Sejm ranked fourth, behind Solidarity, the Catholic Church, and the 
. '''- ,'" ..•. ,.., ,~,,~: -"~""" ..... "c::':_.~ t:;.>_ .Q_ '~. __ /:::: _." __ ~-',.:J.""'__ '.::",,~ • ~:)~b . 
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Army. In the official poll, some 82 percent expressed trust in the Sejm; in 
the Solidarity poll, 50 percent.ll These figures were much higher than for 
any other political institution, even for "the government" broadly 
considered. In another poll in the summer of 1981 on how well various 
institutions had done in helping alleviate the crisis, the Sejm ranked 
behind only the Church and Solidarity, receiving a positive assessment 
from half the sample (Spoleczeristwo polskie). 
The relative popularity and apparent viability of the Sejm led many 
Poles to focus on that institution as an object for political reform. In the 
summer of 1981, there was some discussion of a possible second chamber 
of the Sejm, to consist of deputies more genuinely representative of 
society. In Solidarity's Program, adopted at the union's October Congress, 
part of the program for establishing a "self-governing republic" consisted 
of the restoration of the authority of the Sejm and the amending of 
election rules to allow all political parties and organizations to nominate 
candidates. After free elections, the Sejm should then be "the supreme 
power in the state. " By the end of 1981, over 70 percent of the population 
favored calling new elections to the Sejm and peoples' councils as one 
means of coping with the crisis (Polacy '81; cited in Mason, 1985: 174). 
THE SEJM AND LABOR ISSU,ES IN 1980-81 
A major issue that the Sejm, and indeed the country, had to face in 1981 
was the new legislation on trade unions and on self-management. A new 
trade union bill became imperative from the very beginning, with the 
formation of the Independent Self-Government Trade Union, Solidarity. 
Legislation confirming the legality of the l;teW situation was high on the 
agenda of Solidarity during the first half of ~ 981. Such legislation acquired 
urgency, from the regime's point of view as well, after some twenty of the 
old "branch" unions had withdrawn from the umbrella organization, the 
Central Council of Trade Unions, forcing the dissolution of the CCTU at 
the end of 1980. During the second half o(the year, the major demand of 
Solidarity, and the most divisive issue' between the union and the 
government, concerned the new legislation governing enterprise self-
management. 
As with the legislation on the Teachers' Charter, the Sejm was not 
involved in the early stages of either of these labor issues, but entered only 
later in a mediating role. In this case, as in others, the Sejm was ignored 
in the early stages. The legislature seemed to be caught in the middle; it 
was apparently viewed as potentially too independent by the authorities, 
and as potentially too compliant by the workers. The pattern with the new 
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trade union legislation was typical: it began with the regime's appointment 
of a commission to revise the labor union laws. 
In the Gdansk Agreements, in the first point allowing the creation of 
independent trade unions, the government agreed to pursue a new trade 
unions' bill. The same day as the Agreements, Party leader Edward Gierek 
appointed a commission to develop such a bill, attached to the Central 
Council of Trade Unions. The composition of this commission was widely 
criticized, leading Gierek's successor, Stanislaw Kania, to replace it in late 
September with a more representative group. This one consisted of 
seventeen lawyers and legal experts, twelve Solidarity representatives 
(including Lech Wal{~sa), and five from the official unions. It was presided 
over by Sylwester Zawadzki, Chairman of the Sejm Legislative Committee 
(Sabat, 1981). 
After seven months of work, the commission submitted a draft text of 
the law to the Council of State. Reflecting most of the demands of the 
workers, the document recognized both the right to strike and the 
principle of organizational pluralism. The Council of State, "taking note 
of the position of the Government Presidium" (which had reservations), 
forwarded it on to the Sejm at the end of May. There the two relevant 
committees (on Labor and Social Affairs and on Legislation) established 
a subcommittee to continue work on the legislation. As with the similar 
subcommittee formed to work on the Teachers' Charter, representatives 
of labor unions (including Wah~sa) frequently participated in the 
subcommittee's deliberations. There were continued disagreements be-
tween the government and Solidarity on some key issues, and even though 
the government had promised to have the bill by the end of the year, the 
debates continued right up until December 13. At the fateful and final 
meeting of Solidarity's national leadership in Radom on December 3, 
Solidarity demanded that the Sejm be presented with the Trade Union bill 
"in the version agreed to with representatives of Solidarity" (Tygodnik 
SolidarnoH:, December 11, 1981). However, progress on this bill was 
interrupted with martial law, and was not resumed until February of 1982 
(see below). 
i Self-management 
T~e role of the Sejm was somewhat more evident and much more decisive 
on! the self-management bill though, as with other cases, the Sejm was 
involved only quite late in the process. Self-management was not one of 
the issues raised during the dockyard strikes in the summer of 1980 and 
did not become an element in Solidarity's program until the summer of 
1981. The initiatives for enterprise self-management came not from the 
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Solidarity leadership, but from an unofficial "Network" of self-
management initiatives among Solidarity activists, and from the govern-
ment, whose January 1981 economic reform guidelines suggested 
broadening the role of workers' self-management. 
By the summer of 1981, Solidarity had officially adopted the demand 
for self-management, based largely on the" Network" proposals. By then, 
the government had also introduced its draft Bill on Workers' Self-
Management. There were numerous differences in the two versions, but 
the most important centered on the hiring and firing of factory directors. 
Solidarity wanted the workers to hire and fire the director, and the 
director simply to carry out decisions of the self-management council. The 
government bill provided only that the workers would be consulted on 
management appointments, and that the ultimate power to hire or fire 
would remain with the party (Ash 1983). 
The conflict over this issue reached a high pitch during Solidarity's 
national congress in September. Numerous delegates spoke out against 
the government bill. In the two-week interim between the first and second 
sessions of the Congress, Solidarity representatives met with the Sejm 
committees working on the bill and reached a compromise (Tygodnik 
Solidarnosc, October 2, 1981). Walesa managed to persuade Solidarity's 
Presidium to accept the compromise bill, but the next day Party First 
Secretary Kania informed the PUWP deputies to the Sejm that the 
compromise was not acceptable. That evening, representatives of the non-
PUWP Sejm deputies told Prime Minister J aruzelski that they would not 
vote for the Party version of the bill. 
Paradoxically, the regime's customary desire to achieve unanimity in 
the Sejm plenary sessions gives the small non-PUWP factions a 
disproportionate voice. The government in, this case could easily have won 
victory without their votes. But in an effort to avoid a split vote, the 
government allowed further modifications of the bill. The Sejm com-
mittees thus returned to the bill, worked intensively on it for two more 
days, and finally achieved a bill close to ti}e one the Solidarity Presidium 
had approved. It was passed in the Sejm ob September 25, the day before 
the opening of the second session of Solidarity's Congress. 
This was not the end of the matter, since deputies at the reconvened 
Solidarity Congress were incensed at Walesa's perceived authoritarian 
behavior in reaching the compromise, and at the nature of the compromise 
itself. They passed one resolution censoring Solidarity's Presidium for its 
methods, and another calling on individual enterprises to hold referenda 
on whether they would abide by the compromise formula. The issue of 
self-management remained a divisive one l through the end of the year. 
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This issue, like others, showed the difficult position the Sejm was in. In 
this case, the Sejm was too independent from the regime's point of view, 
and too compliant for many Solidarity activists. Nevertheless, the ability 
of the Sejm to challenge the regime, and to pressure both Solidarity and 
the government to compromise, was unprecedented. As the British 
journalist T. G. Ash (1983: 214) later wrote: 
the behavior of the Sejm was without precedent in the history of Poland since 
1947. For the first time, infected with democracy after a year of revolution, the 
deputies had directly and publicly rejected the communist Party whip. 
Even apart from this dramatic episode, the Sejm had defined a new and 
more expanded role for itself during 1981. With the Teachers' Charter, the 
Bill on Trade Unions, and the Bill on Self-Management, the Sejm was able 
to act as mediator in helping to achieve a compromise between different 
interests and positions. This was accomplished largely through the 
committees (and unofficial meetings of some of their chairmen), which 
were able to meet more frequently, and with less publicity, than the 
plenary sessions of the Sejm. Such meetings allowed a freer exchange of 
views and, probably because of the lack of publicity, a greater Willingness 
on each side to compromise. The Sejm was in a unique position to carry 
out this role. In a society that distrusted almost everything official, the 
Sejm managed to maintain some degree of integrity and popular 
; acceptance, as an institution. On the other hand, the Sejm of 1981 had 
I been elected in early 1980, before Solidarity, and therefore consisted 
! largely of people acceptable to the regime. From the regime's point of 
view, then, the membership of the Sejm, at least, could probably be trusted 
not to go too far toward accommodating Solidarity. 
THE SEJM UNDER MARTIAL LAW 
The role of the Sejm after the declaration of martial law was, of course, 
greatly reduced, but even then did not return entirely to the "rubber 
stamp" role of earlier years. Partially because of Jaruzelski's inability to 
win the Sejm's approval for the Extraordinary Powers Bill in late 1981, 
ma;rtiallaw was invoked without formal legal sanction. Only after the fact 
wa~ martial law formally established by the State Council. At the first 
Sejim session under martial law, on January 25-26, the legislature 
ret/'oactively accepted the martial law decree, with only six abstaining 
vo~es and one opposing. All of these were from non-party or Catholic 
(Polish Catholic Social Association) delegates, some of whom voiced 
muted criticism of official policies on the floor of the Sejm. 
This seemed to be the pattern of Sejm behavior in the first year of 
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martial law: the legislature was not able to block legislation, or force 
major changes in it, but some deputies continued to criticize the 
government and its policies, and to abstain on or oppose unpopular 
legislation. Indeed, the Sejm passed a record number of bills (57) in 1982, 
many of them contributing to the enhanced power of the state (Rocznik 
Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1981-1983). But there were critics, such as 
Romuald Bukowski, the non-party deputy who had voted against the 
martial law legislation, who continued to speak out on major issues. In a 
July 5 (1982) Sejm speech Bukowski called for a general amnesty, lifting 
of the ban on suspended organizations (of which Solidarity was one), a 
restoration of civil liberties, and the lifting of martial law (RFER, July 12, 
1982). The Sejm's usual practice of unanimous voting was also broken 
frequently. When the Sejm passed an "anti-parasitism" bill requiring 
most men to work, 22 deputies abstained and 12 opposed the bill. In an 
even blunter form of protest, 9 members voted no and 55 abstained when 
Stanislaw Ciosek was named Minister of Labor Affairs in March 1984. 
Ciosek, as Minister without portfolio in charge of trade union affairs, had 
been the government's main point of contact with Solidarity before and 
after martial law. 
New trade union legislation 
After 1981, the most crucial piece of legislation facing the government, the 
workers, and the Sejm was the trade unions bill. As seen above, work on this 
legislation had continued through most of 1981, but key issues were still 
unresolved at the end of the year. Martial law changed the situation 
dramatically, and the process was practically begun anew when in 
February 1982 the Council of Ministers' Committee on Trade Unions 
published its "Proposals on the Trade iUnion Movement" (Rzeczp-
ospolita, February 22, 1982). This proposal contained mostly general 
considerations 'about the nature of the future trade union movement. The 
trade unions should be self-governing and independent of state and 
administrative agencies, but they should support socialist democracy, and 
should have the right to strike only as a Jast resort, and not for political 
purposes. 
Initially, at least, it appeared that the 'regime had not ruled out the 
possible reactivation of Solidarity, although in a more restricted form. 
Discussions on the government's "Proposals" in the press and in the 
Party often included this possibility as one alternative (RFER, April 26, 
1982). But by the time the Sejm was charged with working out the details 
of the new legislation in July, the government's parameters for change 
seemed to exclude any possible role for SQlidarity . 
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This time, unlike 1981, the Sejm had no real mediating role, in that there 
was no legal alternative to the government proposal. The Sejm was meant 
to use the "discussions" of the government proposals as a resource for 
developing its legislation, but its task was largely restricted to working out 
the details within the parameters set by the, authorities. According to the 
underground leadership of Solidarity, the law that finally emerged had 
little relationship to the 1981 draft, having been thoroughly revised by the 
Council of State" without any negotiations or consultations with Polish 
society." Of the seventy-five articles of the December 1981 draft, fifty-five 
had been significantly changed (Bujak, 1983). Even the Sejm's Socio-
economic Council, set up by the martial law authorities to discuss pending 
legislation, was not consulted on the bill. 
According to the new statutes (Bienek, 1983), the new unions were to 
be " independent of the administrative and economic organs of the state" ; 
on the other hand, they were to be grounded on the principle of the social 
ownership of the means of production, to recognize the constitutional 
principle of the leading role of the Party, and to respect the constitutional 
bases of the foreign policy of Poland (meaning Poland's alliance with the 
Soviet Union). The new unions were to be organized on the" branch" 
basis (rather than the regional one of Solidarity) and could be organized 
only at the factory level until 1984. Until 1985, only one trade union 
would be allowed in qny one enterprise. 
The new unions were extremely controversial. The law that created the 
new structure had also banned Solidarity, so carried negative connotations 
for that reason. Furthermore, the Solidarity underground called for a 
boycott of the new unions and demanded" trade union pluralism" at the 
enterprise level. By the middle of 1983, the official press began to suggest 
the "pluralism" could be a blind for "counterrevolutionary activity" and 
by the summer of 1984, government spokesmen were rejecting the notion 
of pluralism out of hand. 
Despite the Solidarity boycott, enough people joined the new unions so 
that by the end of 1984, there were some 5 million members. This was only 
half the number that had belonged to Solidarity; but according to several 
different academic surveys,12 about a third of the members of the new 
uqions had also been in Solidarity. As one might expect, there was much 
bitterness and division over the issue of the new unions: between members 
ajd non-members and especially between Solidarity members who joined 
and those who did not. Non-members overwhelmingly thought people 
joined the unions for the material benefits only. Members, however, gave 
a variety of reasons, including a belief (by some 21 percent) in the 
possibility of defending workers' interests through the new unions 
J 
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(" Lublin 83 "). Of union members 65 percent strongly support the new 
unions; among non-unionists, 50 percent are not interested in them, and 
another 14 percent considered themselves "opponents" of the new 
structures (Zwiazkowiec, 1985). 
Despite the importance and controversy associated with the new unions 
(or perhaps because of it), Poland's legislature seems to have been only 
marginally involved in the development of the new legislation after 
martial law, or in the various modifications and emendations of the 
legislation that followed in 1983 and afterwardsY The important role of 
mediator that the Sejm had played in 1981 was no longer necessary in the 
absence of opposing groups and opposing policies. In developing the trade 
union legislation of 1982, the regime did attempt to "consult" with society 
and with experts, and to elicit public comments. But these efforts were 
circumscribed both by the authorities and by the tense environment of 
martial law. Poland was no longer the forum for the kind of open and 
free-wheeling debate that requires mediation. The general pattern for the 
new trade union bill was determined by the Council of Ministers, the State 
Council, and, presumably, the Politburo. The Sejm, and even the advisory 
Socio-economic Council attached to it and appointed by the martial law 
authorities, was excluded from the process. 
HYPOTHESES: THE SEJM AND'POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The changed nature of the political environment in Poland in the period 
1980-82 allows the testing of some of Olson and Mezey's hypotheses 
(chapter 1) about the nature of parliamentary activity. 
I 
Policy attributes 
In the Polish case, it seems to be true (Hypothesis 15) that the activity of 
the parliament is greater on issues which are new and controversial and 
which involve diverse publics. One might add also that such activity 
increases in new situations, since in this case it was the newness of the 
situation that generated the controversy, the saliency, and the mul-
tiplication of publics. In normal times, the Sejm's role has been much 
more limited, and is restricted to relativelY routine matters. A European 
commentator only slightly overstates the case in arguing that" the entire 
activity of the [East European] parliaments consists of either approving 
acts and decrees of the state council, or routinely adopting the national 
plan and budget" (Hazan: 38). 
During 1981, many more of the issues that came to the Sejm were new 
and controversial, and therefore attracted the attention and energy of the 
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parliament. This was especially true of labor issues, which were central 
elements in the whole process or "renewal." Of course the Sejm did 
address other more routine matters as well during 1981, such as the 
reorganization and renaming of a number of government ministries. 
These matters, however, were more bureaucratic than political, therefore 
less controversial and involved less input from the Sejm. 
By 1982, the trade union and self-management issues were still 
controversial, but they were no longer new, many people had turned away 
from political issues, and some of the most important groups in society 
were not allowed an official role in the debate. The role of the Sejm was 
correspondingly reduced. 
With regard to Hypothesis 16, the role of the Sejm was the greatest 
during the intermediate stages oflegislative development. Neither in 1981 
nor earlier did the Sejm playa major role in initiating legislation. Both the 
trade union legislation and the self-management proposals originated 
outside of parliament, occasionally with competing versions being 
developed by the government (in the Council of Ministers) or extra-
governmental groups (like Solidarity). On these two issues, as with others, 
the primary role of the Sejm was a mediating role, attempting to find a 
middle ground in the legislation that was acceptable to both sides. A 
possible role for the Sejm in the implementation stage was truncated by 
martial law, before these two acts could be effectively implemented. 
Internal influences 
Normally, the role of legislatures in communist countries is weak because 
of the domination of the communist party (Hypothesis 10), the centralized 
nature of the party (11), and the control of the parliamentary party by the 
executive agencies of the party (12). While all of these remained true in 
Poland, in all three cases the role of the Polish United Workers' Party 
diminished during 1981, contributing to the enhanced role of the 
legislature. In Poland, there were other parties and factions in the Sejm, 
but these typically had not played an independent role. During 1981, the 
"satellite" parties, the Catholic factions, and the non-party candidates all 
as~umed a stronger role, occasionally even forcing the government to 
compromise on issues to avoid a split vote in the legislature. Furthermore, 
the PUWP itself became divided and demoralized during 1981, and this 
wds reflected in its parliamentary faction as well, which did not always 
blindly follow the party whip. 
Most of the activity of the Polish parliament occurred within its 
committees. While the reasons for this locus of activity are many, as 
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discussed below, their effectiveness during 1981 was enhanced by the fact 
that they are permanent and largely parallel the structure of the 
government's ministries14 (Hypothesis 13). This enabled members of the 
committees to work directly with their counterparts in the relevant 
government ministries, and to bring in their own experts who could, in 
turn, have influence on the ministerial officials. 
Indeed, the gradual development of the committee system in the Sejm 
was a major factor allowing the Sejm to take advantage of its own 
opportunities when the external conditions changed with the birth of 
Solidarity. The gradual growth in the number of parliamentary com-
mittees over the years, the increasing sophistication of the structure and 
functioning of the committee system, and the increasing relevance of 
committees' jurisdictions all contributed to the Sejm's ability to act with 
dispatch and efficiency in what was otherwise an unstable, even chaotic, 
environment. Without the committee system, and the carelul procedures 
developed to coordinate the committees, the Solidarity events could well 
have produced chaos inside the Sejm and immobilized it.15 
External influences 
In the Polish case, the environment, broadly considered, is by far the most 
important determinant of the role of the Sejm. Both in the past, and in 
recent years, the Sejm's role has increased during periods of popular 
unrest and leadership instability. To some extent, the political elite allows 
greater latitude at such times in an effort to restore regime legitimacy and 
social order. But, to an even greater extent, the more active role of the 
Sejm in 1981 (as after the 1956 and 1970 events) was due to the more open 
atmosphere that allowed the formation ofllew interest groups (Hypothesis 
9), especially Solidarity. With the emergence of genuine political conflict 
between Solidarity and the government' (Hypothesis 7), a forum for 
compromise and mediation was required, and the Sejm was one of the 
organizations that played such a role. In our rather limited case study, the 
role of the Sejm was greatest on the Teachers' Charter bill, where a 
functionally specialized interest group (the Polish Teachers' Association) 
was involved (Hypothesis 6) and where this group disagreed with 
Teachers' Solidarity (Hypothesis 8). Perhaps the role of the legislature 
would have been even greater if there had been more such specialized 
groups. At the time, the broad-based and heterogeneous Solidarity 
claimed to speak for most groups in society, and was jealous of this role. 
In many cases, the Solidarity leadership wanted to deal directly with the 
appropriate government ministers or party officials, leaving the Sejm on 
the sidelines. 
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Hypothesis 2 also holds in the Polish case. In general, the role of the 
Sejm has not been very great precisely because the "executive branch" 
(including the party) is closed, centralized, and hegemonic. During 1981, 
however, the governmental ministries became more "open," in their 
willingness to discuss and negotiate with Solidarity and other groups; and 
the party became more decentralized, as grass-roots reformism swept 
through the organization and transformed its leadership. All of this was 
reversed with a vengeance after December 1981, once again reducing the 
Sejm's room for maneuver. For the Polish parliament, the environmental 
factors loom large indeed. 
Both before and after the Solidarity experience, with a more monolithic 
political system, there was no need for a mediator among groups and 
positions, as had been the function of the Sejm in 1981. As we have seen 
before, the role of the Sejm in "normal" times is largely a passive one, 
approving and sometimes revising legislation that is born and developed 
elsewhere. The Sejm may be "consulted" by the government, but the role 
of the Sejm is largely defined by the executive authorities of the 
government and the party. During 1981, however, with the proliferation 
of independent and autonomous interest groups and their interaction with 
government agencies (itself a reflection of the increased openness of the 
government), the Sejm was able somewhat to define its own role, and to 
leap into this more pluralistic environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The pattern of participation and activity by the Sejm in recent years 
conforms to that described in the Introduction: the Sejm is a kind of 
barometer that reflects what else is happening in the society and the 
political system. In times of upheaval, when the regime is forced to allow 
a somewhat more open political environment, the Sejm can also develop 
somewhat more autonomy. The Solidarity era was the most open in recent 
Polish history, and the Sejm played its most active and important role in 
the postwar period. Even so, its field for maneuver was limited by both 
"internal" and" external" constraints (Blondel, 1973). Internally, the 
parliament was constrained by its members, who had all been elected in 
tht pre-Solidarity period. As an institution then, the Sejm was not as much 
pa~t of the" renewal" that swept Polish society in 1981 as were most other 
institutions, including the party, which underwent considerable turnover 
from bottom to top. Party members retained a majority in the Sejm, and 
it was the same Party members who were elected before Gdansk. 
Externally, the Sejm was constrained both by the constitutional principle 
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of the leading role of the party, and by the continued (though weakened) 
dominance of the executive agencies of both the party and the state and, 
as 1981 progressed, the army. 
Despite these constraints, the Sejm was involved in a major way on 
major pieces of legislation, including the critical bills on self-management 
and on trade unions. It was able to do this in two ways: through 
mediation, and through its constitutional prerogatives for approving all 
legislation. The Sejm, and particularly its committees, was able to mediate 
between Solidarity and the government (and sometimes with third parties) 
by virtue of its relatively autonomous and neutral position in the political 
system. The committees were particularly appropriate for this mediating 
role because of the informality and relative secrecy of their sessions and 
their ability to meet more frequently than the plenum. The Sejm 
committees were never entirely trusted by either the government or by 
Solidarity, but neither were they entirely distrusted. They were able, 
therefore, to play this limited mediating role. 
The second factor is the constitutional requirement that the Sejm pass 
all legislation. In some communist states, the parliament is often bypassed 
on important policy issues, and this has been true to some extent in 
Poland. But, in Poland, the Sejm has existed as an institution for over 400 
years, and its formal constitutional powers have been respected de jure if 
not always de facto. Thus, all the major reform bills of 1981 were sent 
through the Sejm. In practice, of course, the majority position of the 
Polish United Workers' Party in the parliament would have allowed easy 
control of the legislative process. Somewhat paradoxically, however, as we 
saw in the case of the self-management bill, the regime's desire to achieve 
unanimity in the Sejm plenary sessions gave the minority factions a 
disproportionate voice. When this group threatened 1;1ot to vote for the 
government's self-management bill, the government allowed further 
modifications of the bill. In this sense, this minority group achieved a role 
similar to that of a small third party holding the swing votes in a 
parliament closely divided between two larger parties. 
During 1981, the Sejm seems to have moved from what Blondel (1973) 
calls a "truncated" legislature with only limited influence on a limited 
number of issues, to the next most active type, which he calls" inhibited. " 
As he describes such legislatures (p. 139), they have" fairly considerable 
influence in immediate matters but very little influence, even in the long 
run, on general matters. They have some effective power in constraining 
executive legislation, but even this has its limits; they have very little 
power to initiate new ideas, and their initiative remains concentrated on 
intermediate questions." Certainly, though, the 1981 Sejm would be at the 
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low end of this category, in which Blondel places both the French and the 
Indian legislatures. 
The Sejm, like most other institutions in Poland, became more active 
and independent during 1981. Unlike Solidarity, other trade unions, and 
most cultural and academic institutions, however, the growing in-
dependence of the Sejm was restrained by the party and state leadership, 
and may even have been engineered by the authorities to convey the 
impression of vitality and "renewal" within the government. In the 
process, the Sejm did become more active, contributing to the very real 
democratization that was occurring throughout Polish society. From the 
regime's point of view, this began to undermine the ultimate constitutional 
(and geopolitical) requirement of the leading role of the Party. With 
martial law, all independent political activity was banned, most 
independent institutions were abolished or restructured, and the Sejm 
returned to its more passive role of a truncated legislature. 
I 
Notes 
This chapter was written before the momentous changes in Poland in the 
summer and fall of 1989, including the establishment of a second 
parliamentary chamber, the Senate; the holding of parliamentary elections in 
June, which were fully contested in the Senate and partially contested in the 
Sejm; Solidarity's capture of virtually every seat available to it in both 
chambers; the defection of the communist party's "satellite" parties to 
Solidarity; and the subsequent formation of a Solidarity-led government 
under Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. These changes herald the 
emergence in Poland of a genuinely democratic and functional legislature, and 
indeed of parliamentary democracy. 
2 The three Catholic political associations are Pax, the Christian Social 
Association and the Polish Catholic Social Union. 
3 For further treatment of the role and functioning of the Sejm, see Simon and 
Olson (1980), Terry (1981), and Hazan (1985), pp. 33-56. 
4 For a review of the literature on communist legislatures, see Nelson (1982). 
5 Of the 173 bills passed between October 1980 and February 1985, 150 were 
initiated by the Council of State or the government, and 23 by Sejm deputies, 
either in groups or through committees (Niektore Dane Statystyczne, 1985). 
6 For the changes that affected even the Polish United Workers' Party, see 
Mason (1984). 
7 This policy on voting for appointments continued even after the imposition of 
martial law. 
8 This figure declined steadily after 1981 to 120 in 1982, 70 in 1983, and 59 in 
1984. 
9 This figure declined to about 10;000 per year after 1981. 
10 This version of events has been challengeci by some members of the Sejm (in 
discussions with the authors), who conten~ that there was no real conflict in 
the Sejm on this issue. Some Solidarity supporters, on the other hand, believe 
the Extraordinary Powers Bill was a smokescreen put up by a government that 
had planned martial law months before. 
11 For the full results of these surveys, by the government's OBOP and 
Solidarity's OBS, see Mason (1985), p. 118. A national representative sample 
in 1984 showed 60.5 percent still expressing trust in the Sejm. 
12 For example, an unpublished pilot survey conducted in July 1983 by the 
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University of Warsaw of 697 employees in the city of Lublin; and a second 
unpublished national representative sample of adults conducted in the spring 
of 1984. 
13 Some members of the Sejm's leadership have strongly disagreed with this 
point, contending that the role of the Sejm, at least in legislative matters, was 
more substantial after martial law than before, and pointing to the high 
number of bills passed in 1982 and 1983 as evidence of such influence and 
activity. 
14 As part of Gierek's efforts to strengthen the role of the Sejm in 1971, 
committee jurisdictions were redrawn to better correspond to ministerial 
divisions, and the ministries were instructed to consult with the relevant Sejm 
committees in drafting legislation (Terry: 33-4). 
15 The author is indebted to David Olson for the ideas in this paragraph. 
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